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1991
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91_5397a
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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being
done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The
syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared
by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United ______
States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.______ ___________________
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
NEGONSOTT v. SAMUELS, WARDEN, ET AL. ____
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
No. 91-5397. Argued January 11, 1993 - Decided February 24, 1993
Petitioner Negonsott, a member of the Kickapoo Tribe and a resident of the
Kickapoo reservation in Kansas, was convicted by a County District Court jury
of aggravated battery for shooting another Indian on the reservation. The
court set aside the conviction on the ground that the Federal Government had
exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute Negonsott for the shooting under the
Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U. S. C. S1153, which encompasses 13 enumerated
felonies committed by ``[a]ny Indian against . . . the person or property of
another Indian or other person . . . within the Indian country.'' However,
the State Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, holding that the Kansas
Act, 18 U. S. C. S3243, conferred on Kansas jurisdiction to prosecute all
crimes committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations in the State.
Subsequently, the Federal District Court dismissed Negonsott's petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The Kansas Act explicitly confers jurisdiction on Kansas over all_____
offenses involving Indians on Indian reservations. Congress has plenary
authority to alter the otherwise exclusive nature of federal jurisdiction
under S1153. Standing alone, the Kansas Act's first sentence - which confers
jurisdiction on Kansas over ``offenses committed by or against Indians on
Indian reservations . . . to the same extent as its courts have jurisdiction
over offenses committed elsewhere within the State in accordance with the laws
of the State'' - is an unambiguous grant of jurisdiction over both major and
minor offenses. And the most logical meaning of the Act's second sentence -
which provides that nothing in the Act shall ``deprive'' federal courts of
their ``jurisdiction over offenses defined by the laws of the United States'' -
is that federal courts shall retain their
I II NEGONSOTT v. SAMUELS ____
Syllabus
jurisdiction to try all offenses subject to federal jurisdiction, while Kansas
courts shall have jurisdiction to try persons for the same conduct when it
violates state law. This is the only reading of the Kansas Act that gives
effect to every clause and word of the statute, and it is supported by the
Act's legislative history. In contrast, if this Court were to accept
Negonsott's argument that the second sentence renders federal jurisdiction
exclusive whenever the underlying conduct is punishable under federal law,
Kansas would be left with jurisdiction over only those minor offenses
committed by one Indian against the person or property of another, a result
that can hardly be reconciled with the first sentence's unqualified grant of
jurisdiction. There is no need to resort to the canon of statutory
construction that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of Indians, since
the Kansas Act quite unambiguously confers jurisdiction on the State.
Pp. 2-12.
933 F. 2d 818, affirmed.
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE,
BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined, and in all but
Part II-B of which SCALIA and THOMAS, JJ., joined.